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Witnesses, and the American Patients’
Rights Movement1
Charles H. Baron
Boston College Law School, Newton Centre, MA, USA
As de Tocqueville observed in the mid-nineteenth
century, the United States has been a fertile ground
for the growth of an “innumerable multitude” of
religious sects.2 America was founded and settled
in great part by persons who were seeking religious
freedom in the new world, which had been de-
nied to them in the old world. The constitutions of
the 50 states generally protect such religious free-
dom. And the first article of the Bill of Rights of
the Constitution of the United States provides that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. . ..” This language has been interpreted,
among other things, to protect all religious beliefs
1 This paper is an updated English version of two articles
that have previously been published in French: Baron,
C., Sang Peche` et Mort: les Te`moins de Je`hovah et le
mouvement des droits des malades, in Revue Trimestrielle
du ressort de la our d’Appel de Versailles, Octobre-
De`cembre 1993, p. 93, and Baron, C., Aspects relatifs au
mouvement des droits des malades aux E`tats-Unis in S.
Gromb & A. Garay (eds.), CONSENTEMENT E`CLAIRE` ET
TRANSFUSION SANGUINE (1996), p. 30.
2 De Tocqueville, A., “Democracy in America 290” (Mayer,
ed., Perennial Library, 1988).
from discriminatory governmental interference.3
Thus, in theory at least, American law—as well as
American history and tradition—encourages indi-
viduals and groups to seek after their spiritual well-
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One of America’s most flourishing religious
groups is the Watchtower Bible and Tract
Society—commonly known as “Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses.” Born in the early 1870s as a Christian Bible
study group in western Pennsylvania, it has grown
into a worldwide organization comprising over four
million adherents in over 200 countries. A central
tenet of the group is a commitment to the Bible
as the word of God (Jehovah) representing literal
truth. Members of the group devote a great deal of
effort to bringing the word of the Bible to nonmem-
bers. In the United States, they distribute literature
from house to house and in public places. Because
of these proselytizing activities and because their
beliefs and practices they are sometimes perceived
as disturbingly different from those of the majority
(if not harmful); governmental agencies have of-
ten tried to regulate them in ways that were con-
trary to their beliefs. As a result, Witnesses have
been involved in a great deal of constitutional liti-
gation in the United States—much of it is before the
3 See, for example, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1997) (holding unconstitutional
a city’s ban on “ritual slaughter” of animals that was in-
tended to discriminate against the Santeria religion which
engaged in such practices).
Alternatives to Blood Transfusion in Transfusion Medicine,
2nd edition. Edited by A. Maniatis, P. Van der Linden,
J.-F. Hardy. C© 2010 Blackwell Publishing.
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FS530 Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Rights Movement
Supreme Court of the United States. Indeed, more
American constitutional law may have been made
by Jehovah’s Witnesses than by any other group.4
Among the beliefs that set Witnesses apart
from most other Americans is their conviction
that the Bible forbids them to accept blood
transfusions—even to save their lives—because it
would constitute the sin of “eating blood.” The line
of thought that results in this conviction comprises
two steps. First, Witnesses read the Bible as pro-
hibiting Christians, as well as Jews, from eating
blood. Second, they believe “eating blood” includes
not only ingestion by mouth but also ingestion by
other means—including blood transfusions.
There are, of course, scriptural provisions regard-
ing the eating of blood that apply only to Jews.
At Leviticus 17:10–12, for example, God says to
Moses:
As for any man of the house of Israel or some alien
resident who is residing as an alien in their midst who
eats any sort of blood, I shall certainly set my face
against the soul that is eating the blood, and I shall in-
deed cut him off from among his people. For the soul
of the flesh is in its blood, and I myself have put upon
the altar for you to make atonement for your souls,
because it is the blood that makes atonement by the
soul in it. That is why I have said to the sons of Israel:
“No soul of you must eat blood and no alien resident
who is residing as an alien in your midst should eat
blood.”
This provision is part of God’s special covenant
with Israel, and therefore, applies only to Jews. But
the ban on eating blood, the Witnesses point out,
antedates Mosaic Law. At Genesis 9:1–4, God says
to Noah after the flood:
Be fruitful and become many and fill the earth. And a
fear of you and a terror of you will continue upon ev-
ery living creature of the earth and upon every flying
creature of the heavens, upon everything that goes
moving on the ground, and upon all the fishes of the
sea. Into your hand they are now given. Every mov-
4 Between 1919 and 1988, the Supreme Court of the
United States heard 71 cases in which the sect’s practices
raised important questions of federal substantive or con-
stitutional law. In 47 of them, the Court ruled in favor of
the Jehovah’s Witnesses.
ing animal that is alive may serve as food for you. As
in the case of green vegetation, I do give it all to you.
Only the flesh with its soul—its blood—you must
not eat.
This ban predates the covenant with Israel and is
universal. God’s ban on eating blood is thus binding
on everyone who worships him. It is not contingent
upon acceptance of the covenant with Israel, and it
applies to Christians as well as Jews.
Further scriptural authority for this is provided
by Acts 15:28–29. There the first council of the
new Christian church, in response to a question as
to whether converts to Christianity were to be cir-
cumcised according to Mosaic Law, replies:
[T]he Holy Spirit and we ourselves have favored
adding no further burden to you, except these nec-
essary things, to keep abstaining from things sacri-
ficed to idols and from blood and from things stran-
gled and from fornication. If you carefully keep your-
selves from these things, you will prosper.5
For the Witnesses, it is clear that God has com-
manded all his people to abstain from eating blood.
And if eating blood is wrong because it is wrong to
nourish one’s self with the soul of another living
being, they contend, how can it matter if the nour-
ishment comes by way of one’s mouth or by way
of a transfusion directly into one’s veins? Of course
the Bible does not speak of blood transfusions be-
cause there was no thought of them at the time.
But the principle is the same. “[T]he decree that
Christians must ‘abstain from blood’ . . . covers the
taking of blood into the body, whether through the






After World War II, this part of the belief struc-
ture of Jehovah’s Witnesses began increasingly to
come into direct conflict with the belief struc-
ture of modern medicine. Until then, doctors and
surgeons had not regularly availed themselves of
blood transfusions. A Frenchman—Jean Baptiste
Denis—is credited with having performed the first
5 For other authority to the same effect, see Watchtower
Bible and Tract Society, Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Question
of Blood. 1977, pp. 10–17.
6 Watchtower Bible and Tract Society. Jehovah’s Witnesses
and the Question of Blood. 1977, p.18.
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cessful” in that the 15-year-old boy whom he trans-
fused with a half pint of lamb’s blood did not die.)
But the foundations of modern transfusion science
were not laid until the early 1900s when the four






it was not until several decades later, after other
scientific advances had been made and “the con-
cept of blood banks was introduced and the exi-
gencies of World War II stimulated the investiga-
tion of methods for blood preservation, that blood
became readily available and blood transfusion be-






medicine begin to believe that blood transfusions
were essentially benign and that refusal of blood,
when “medically necessary,” was an irrational act.
The best-known early American court case act-
ing out the conflict between the beliefs of modern
medicine and those of Jehovah’s Witnesses is Appli-
cation of the President and Directors of Georgetown Col-
lege, Inc.10 Mrs. Jesse Jones, a 25-year-old mother
of a 7-year-old child, had been brought by her hus-
band to the emergency room of the Georgetown
Hospital in the District of Columbia. She had lost
two-thirds of her body’s blood supply from a rup-
tured ulcer. The doctors who took charge of her
case believed that she had a very good chance of
survival with a blood transfusion but that she
would die without one. Mr. and Mrs. Jones
were Jehovah’s Witnesses. They were eager to have
the doctors treat Mrs. Jones, but they would not
consent to a blood transfusion. The doctors con-
sidered this behavior to be medically irrational and
wanted to override the Jones’ refusal in order to
save Mrs. Jones’ life. They sought a court order al-
lowing them to do so.
Judge J. Skelly Wright, a highly respected fed-
eral appeals court judge, gave them the order they
wanted. A lower court judge had refused their re-
7 Hagen P. Blood: Gift or Merchandise? 1982, p.12.
8 Solomon, A history of transfusion medicine, In: Ross A
(ed.) III American Association of Blood Banks, Administrative
Manual 2. 1990.
9 Wintrobe M. Clinical Hematology, 8th edn., 1981.
10 331 F. 2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (hereinafter “George-
town I.”).
quest, and counsel for the hospital, a very famous
and able attorney by the name of Edward Ben-
nett Williams, had immediately appealed to Judge
Wright, asking him for an emergency order to
keep the patient alive—at least until the case could
be fully heard on its merits. Several months after
granting this order, Judge Wright filed an opinion
in which he attempted to justify the emergency ac-
tion he had taken. In it he cites two nineteenth
century US Supreme Court decisions which state,
in dictum, that First Amendment “free exercise” of
religion guarantees do not prevent the government
from making religiously-inspired suicide attempts
illegal.11 However, as Judge Wright himself notes,
District of Columbia law did not make attempted
suicide illegal and Mrs. Jones did not want to kill
herself. He also argues that, because she had a 7-
year-old child, Mrs. Jones could be forced to stay
alive since “[t]he state as parens patriae will not al-
low a parent to abandon a child.”12 However, no
statutes or legal precedents could be pointed to sug-
gesting that a parent’s medical treatment decisions
could be overruled on the ground that they placed a
child at risk of abandonment. As a “third set of con-
siderations,” Judge Wright pointed to “the position
of the doctors and the hospital. Mrs. Jones was their
responsibility to treat. The hospital doctors had the
choice of administering the proper treatment or let-
ting Mrs. Jones die in the hospital bed, thus ex-
posing themselves, and the hospital, to the risk of
civil and criminal liability in either case.”13 How-
ever, as is pointed out in a later opinion by one of
Judge Wright’s fellow judges, Mr. and Mrs. Jones
had both “volunteered to sign a waiver to relieve
the hospital of any liability for the consequences of
failure to effect the transfusion.”14
11 Late Corporation of the Church of Later Day Saints v. United
States (Romney v. United States), 136 U.S. 1, 49–50 (1890);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 166 (1878).
The facts of the cases did not involve suicide. They in-
volved state laws prohibiting the practice of religiously in-
spired polygamy.
12 Georgetown I, p.1008.
13 Georgetown I, p. 1009.
14 Application of the President and Directors of George-
town College, Inc., 331 F. 2d 1010, 1015–16 (D.C. Cir.
1964) (hereinafter “Georgetown II.”).
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The real basis for Justice Wright’s opinion
seems to be that, like the doctors involved, he
found the Jones’ position hard to understand and
irrational—Mrs. Jones’ life was being thrown away
for no good reason. At one point, he suggests that
“Mrs. Jones was in extremis and hardly compos mentis
at the time in question: she was as little able com-
petently to decide for herself as any child would
be.”15 At other points, he raises the possibility that
the Jones really wanted someone else to make the
decision for them—thus relieving them of their
religious obligation.16 Finally, he describes a con-
frontation between Mr. Jones and representatives
of the hospital in terms that suggest that he felt the
latter were being forced to deal with some naive
person who simply did not understand the modern
world:
The President of Georgetown University, Father
Bunn, appeared and pleaded with Mr. Jones to au-
thorize the hospital to save his wife’s life with a blood
transfusion. Mr. Jones replied that the Scriptures say
that we should not drink blood, and consequently
his religion prohibited transfusions. The doctors ex-
plained to Mr. Jones that a blood transfusion is totally
different from drinking blood in that the blood physi-
cally goes into a different part and through a different
process in the body. Mr. Jones was unmoved.17
Despite all its problems, the Georgetown decision
came to wield an extraordinary influence in Amer-
ican law. The flaws are evident. No counsel was
present to argue the Jones’ side of the case. (Al-
though Judge Wright had advised Mr. Jones to seek
counsel, he had declined to do so.) Judge Wright
himself admitted that the case’s emergency circum-
stances required that he decide it in great haste.
And several of Judge Wright’s colleagues, when a
petition for rehearing was filed a month later, took
the opportunity to write opinions critical of what
he had done and the reasons he gave for doing it.18
That the case has been so influential despite all this
may have something to do with the eminence of
15 Georgetown I, p. 1008.
16 Georgetown I, pp. 1007, 1009.
17 Georgetown I, p. 1007.
18 Georgetown II, pp. 1010–1018.
the judge and the lawyer involved in it. But it prob-
ably has more to do with the fact that the decision
seemed to provide legal endorsement to the grow-
ing hegemony of the medical profession in Amer-
ican society. Counsel for the Joneses on their pe-
tition for a rehearing had argued: “The precedent
created here is a threat to so many other persons
that judicial substitution of medical discretion for
individual discretion should be examined in prin-
ciple to see where it is leading.”19 When the court
denied the petition for rehearing, its decision could
be read as saying for all intents and purposes: “Doc-
tors know best, and doctor’s orders (at least when
life may be at risk) are to be followed.”20
In the wake of the decision, other courts made
themselves available to order Jehovah’s Witnesses
to submit to blood transfusions.21 And even where
courts refused to grant requested orders to force
transfusions, they tended to accept Judge Wright’s
analytical framework. Often the decisions turned
on whether or not the patient had minor children
who would be “abandoned” by the death of a par-
ent.22 One court, in 1972, refused to order a trans-
fusion for a Witness who was a father of minor chil-
dren, but it felt compelled to justify its decision on
the ground that “a close family relationship existed
which went beyond the immediate members, that
the children would be well cared for, and that the
family business would continue to supply material
needs.”23
19 Georgetown II, p. 1013.
20 In fact, as the court points out, its denial of the peti-
tion for rehearing was not meant to suggest any position
on the merits of Judge Wright’s decision. Georgetown II,
p. 1010.
21 See, for example, Hamilton v. McAuliffe, 277 Md. 336,
353 A. 2d 634 (1976); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp.
752 (D.C. Conn. 1965); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memo-
rial Hospital v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A. 2d 537 (1964).
22 Compare In Re Brooks’ Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205
N.E. 2d 435 (1965) with Hamilton v. McAuliffe, 277 Md.
336, 353 A. 2d 634 (1976) and Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan
Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A. 2d 537
(1964).
23 In Re Osborne, 294 A. 2d 372, 374 (D.C. Ct. App.
1972).
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In 1976, with the celebrated decision of In Re
Quinlan24 it might have appeared that the plight
of Witness patients who refused blood transfusions
had been ameliorated. In that case, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey recognized the right of Karen
Quinlan, a young woman in a persistent vegetative
state, to “die with dignity.” The court allowed her
family to have her removed from life support de-
spite the unwillingness of her physician to agree
to such a measure. The court based its decision
upon the unwritten constitutional “right to pri-
vacy” which the US Supreme Court had developed
in a series of cases—most prominently, the then re-
cent abortion rights case, Roe v. Wade.25 “Presum-
ably,” said the court, “this right is broad enough
to encompass a patient’s decision to decline medi-
cal treatment under certain circumstances, in much
the same way as it is broad enough to encompass
a woman’s decision to terminate pregnancy under
certain conditions.”26 On the surface, the Quinlan
decision seemed a great victory for patient’s rights.
But a close reading of the opinion revealed that the
decision was not as great a victory for patients as it
had seemed—and that it was not victory at all for
Jehovah’s Witnesses refusing blood transfusions.
In its opinion, the Quinlan court made clear that
the right to refuse treatment was not absolute. Two
important state interests could outweigh it in ap-
propriate cases. The first was the state’s interest in
preserving human life. This interest was not strong
enough to outweigh the right to choose death in
the case before the court because Karen Quinlan’s
life prospects were so poor and because the med-
ical treatment being forced upon her was so inva-
sive. But where such prospects were better or the
treatment being recommended was less intrusive,
treatment might still be forced on a patient. The
second important interest of the state was that of
protecting the professional ethics and discretion of
the medical profession. That interest was not strong
enough to outweigh the right to choose death in
24 70 N.J. 10, 355 A. 2d 647 (1976).
25 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26 In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A. 2d 647, 663
(1976).
Karen’s case because it was not clear that the med-
ical profession as a whole opposed allowing people
in Karen’s condition to refuse treatment. Karen’s
physician had said that he was opposed, but many
doctors, if not all, were in favor of having patients
in a persistent vegetative state removed from life
support. And what made some doctors refuse, as
Karen’s physician had, was fear of legal liability. By
its decision in Quinlan, the court was removing that
fear as a factor. If a particular patient’s doctor still
refused, the court would not force him or her to
comply with the patient’s wishes, but it would al-
low the patient’s family to find another doctor who
would comply.
Thus, Quinlan was less a recognition of patient’s
rights than of physicians’ rights. Treatment could be
refused for Karen Quinlan because such a refusal
was not “medically irrational.” However, patients
refusing treatment which the medical profession
believed to be life-saving and noninvasive could
have treatment forced upon them. That this meant
no change in the law for Jehovah’s Witnesses who
refused blood transfusions was made explicit. A
scant 5 years before Quinlan, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey had decided in John F. Kennedy Memo-
rial Hospital v. Heston27 that blood transfusions could
be forced upon a Jehovah’s Witness patient even
in a case where the patient had no minor children
who might be abandoned by her death. The Quinlan
court took pains to make clear that Heston was still
good law. The Witness cases in general were ap-
proved because the medical procedure involved in
them (a blood transfusion) “constituted a minimal
bodily invasion and the chances of recovery and
return to functioning life were very good.”28 And
Heston in particular was reaffirmed because it in-
volved “most importantly a patient apparently salv-
able to long life and vibrant health—a situation not
at all like the present case.”29
But if Quinlan did not wreak a revolution
for patient’s rights—including those of Jehovah’s
Witnesses—it did provide a foundation upon which
27 58 N.J. 576, 279 A. 2d 670 (1971).
28 70 N.J. at 41, 279 A. 2d at 664.
29 70 N.J. at 39, 279 A. 2d at 663.
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such a revolution could be wrought. Quinlan had
at least recognized patient autonomy as an impor-
tant right. And its reasoning offered a guide as to
how the scope of that right might be expanded.
The medical profession and the courts needed to
be shown that patient refusal of treatment was not
as irrational as it seemed. Even if refusal seemed
irrational from the point of view of the medical
profession, it was very often, if not always, per-
fectly rational in terms of the values of the patients
involved. And more often than the medical profes-
sion and the courts suspected, refusal of treatment
was rational from a medical point of view as well.
Since Quinlan, the Witnesses have earnestly and
persistently worked at establishing their right to
refuse blood transfusions by educating the medi-
cal profession, the courts, and the public as to the
rationality of their views. Education regarding the
scriptural basis for their position has, of course,
been fundamental—as has education regarding the
perceived “invasiveness” of blood transfusions from
the point of view of their religious beliefs and the
poor spiritual “prognosis” they suffer from having
their earthly lives prolonged at the cost of their sal-
vation. (In the words of the family of the patient in
one case: “He wants to live in the Bible’s promised
new world where life will never end. A few hours
here would never compare to everlasting life.”30)
However, they have also done a brilliant job of
making the case for the medical rationality of their
position.
First, they have worked at demonstrating that
blood transfusions, from a purely scientific point
of view, are not the completely benign treatment
modalities they have been thought to be. In this
effort, they have been helped, of course, by the ad-
vent of the blood-borne scourges of AIDS and Hep-
atitis B. But as the Witnesses have shown, blood
transfusions have always been much riskier than
the run-of-the-mill medical practitioner was aware
of or was willing to admit. The evidence for this
comes entirely from scientific literature—literature
which had been largely ignored by the medical pro-
30 In Re Osborne, 294 A. 2d 372, 373 (D.C. Ct. App.
1972).
fession as a whole. In 1960, an article in one medi-
cal journal had warned: “Blood is a dynamite! It can
do a great deal of good or a great deal of harm. The
mortality from blood transfusion equals that from
ether anesthesia or appendectomy. In the London
area, there has been reported one death for every
13,000 bottles of blood transfused.”31 In addition to
the risk of death from hemolytic reactions (due to
improper matching of blood types), there are the
risks that result from the suppression of the body’s
natural immune system caused by a transfusion.
And there are the risks of a long list of diseases, in
addition to AIDS and hepatitis B that can be carried
by transfused blood.
Second, Jehovah’s Witnesses have worked with
surgeons and physicians to develop and popular-
ize methods of operating upon and treating patients
without using blood transfusions. Not only had the
run-of-the-mill physician downplayed the risks of
blood transfusions, he had also exaggerated their
necessity. For decades, anesthesiologists had, for
example, routinely transfused patients preopera-
tively on the grounds of “medical necessity” when-
ever the patient’s hemoglobin had gone below 10
g/dL. They believed this practice had a basis in sci-
entific fact. In reality, it had been based upon myth.
“The etiology of the requirement that a patient
have 10 grams of hemoglobin (Hgb) prior to receiv-
ing an anesthetic,” one scientist reported in 1988,
“is cloaked in tradition, shrouded in obscurity, and
unsubstantiated by clinical or experimental evi-
dence.”32 Members of Jehovah’s Witness hospital
Liaison Committees, which have been established
across the United States (as well as in many other
countries, including France), have met with physi-
cians and surgeons, providing them with informa-
tion that disabuses them of mistaken notions re-
garding the necessity of transfusions and makes
them aware of neglected techniques for treating pa-
tients without blood.
31 Unger. Medical-legal aspects of blood transfusion. NY
State J Med 1960;60(2):237.
32 Zauder, “How did we get a “magic number” for pre-
operative hematocrit, hemoglobin level?” In: Perioperative
Red Cell Transfusion: Program and Abstracts (June 27–29,
1988).
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Through the work of their Hospital Liaison Com-
mittees, the Witnesses claim to have secured the
cooperation of over 13,000 American doctors in
treating Witness patients without blood transfu-
sions. Cooperating surgeons have discovered that
even heart surgery can be performed without im-
posing blood transfusions on the grounds of “med-
ical necessity.” The distinguished cardiac surgeon,
Michael DeBakey, for example, has reported his ex-
perience that “in the great majority of situations
[involving Witnesses] the risk of operation with-
out the use of blood transfusions is no greater than
in those patients on whom we use blood transfu-





patients are often, then, employed with patients
generally. One orthopedic surgeon reports: “What
we have learned from those (Witness) patients,
we now apply to all our patients that we do total
hips on.”34
These gains for the Witnesses within the med-
ical community have helped to produce gains for
them within the legal system as well. After Quin-
lan, the development of “right to die” doctrine by
American courts began to accelerate. In 1977, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Super-
intendent of Belchertown Hospital v. Salkewicz,35 held
that a patient had a constitutional right to refuse
chemotherapy for cancer—even if the patient was
likely to die significantly sooner without treatment
than with it. Like Quinlan, the case involved a situa-
tion where the medical community might not have
thought that refusal of treatment was “medically
irrational.” And like Quinlan, the opinion talked
of state interests that could outweigh the patient’s
right to refuse treatment, adding to the interests in
preserving human life and in protecting the med-
ical profession the additional interests mentioned
in Georgetown—preventing suicide and protecting
third parties such as minor children. But the tone of
the opinion was much more aggressive in asserting
the right of patients to exercise their autonomy in
33 Dixon, Smalley. Jehovah’s Witnesses: the surgi-
cal/ethical challenge. JAMA;246:2471.
34 Watchtower Bible and Tract Society. How Can Blood Save
Your Life? 1990, p. 16.
35 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E. 2d 417 (1977).
medical decision-making. “The constitutional right
to privacy, as we conceive it,” said the court at one
point, “is an expression of the sanctity of individual
free choice and self-determination as fundamental
constituents of life. The value of life as so perceived
is lessened not by a decision to refuse treatment,
but by the failure to allow a competent human be-
ing the right of choice.”36
Cases after Salkewicz increasingly emphasized the
autonomy of patients and allowed them to refuse a
wider range of treatments. Courts gradually moved
from allowing refusal only of “extraordinary” or
“unnatural” or objectively “intrusive” treatment
modalities, to allowing refusal of any sort of
treatment the patients felt to be intrusive in their
particular case.37 Courts enforced the rights of pa-
tients, not only when they wanted mechanical
respiration stopped, but also when they wanted
hydration and nutrition stopped.38 But in one re-
spect, nonetheless, the fact patterns of these cases
threw into question the extent to which they were
truly endorsing patient autonomy. The cases typi-
cally involved patients with a grim prognosis. Most
of the patients were terminally ill, living with ir-
reversible and degenerative physical conditions,
or in a persistent vegetative state. In contrast to
most of the Jehovah’s Witness patients who refuse
blood, they were not likely to be, in the words of
Quinlan, “a patient apparently salvable to long life
and vibrant health.”
It is only recently that courts have begun clearly
to demonstrate their commitment to patient auton-
omy by gradually giving full protection to the right
of Witness patients to refuse blood transfusions.
Although the courts of most jurisdictions have
continued to recognize the possibility that state
interests—particularly the state’s interest in pro-
tecting minors from abandonment by parents—can
outweigh the right of Witnesses to refuse blood
36 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E. 2d 417 (1977) at 742, 370 N.E.
2d at 426.
37 See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 398 Mass. 417,
497 N.E. 2d 626 (1986).
38 Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 398 Mass. 417, 497
N.E. 2d 626 (1986) and see Bouvia v. Superior Ct. 179 Cal.
App. 3d 1127 (1986).
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transfusions, it is becoming very rare for courts to
find the right actually outweighed in any given
case. The highest courts of both Massachusetts39
and Florida40 have made clear that they will force
the state to carry a very heavy burden when it at-
tempts to show that a Witness’ right to refuse a
blood transfusion should be outweighed by his or
her duty to parent minor children. And in 1990,
the highest court of one state—New York—rejected
wholesale the Georgetown device of employing an
obligation to support one’s children to restrict pa-
tient autonomy. “[W]e know of no law in this state
prohibiting individuals from participating in inher-
ently dangerous activities or requiring them to take
special safety precautions simply because they have
minor children,” said the court. “There is no indi-
cation that the State would take a more intrusive
role when the risk the parent has assumed involves
a very personal choice regarding medical care. On
the contrary, the policy of New York, as reflected in
the existing law, is to permit all competent adults
to make their own personal health care decisions
without interference from the State.”41
Even in New Jersey, the Witnesses’ efforts at
educating the courts and medical profession seem
to have turned the law around. In 1992, the Ap-
pellate Division of the Superior Court of New
Jersey handed down In Re Hughes,42 a case in-
volving a Witness patient whose surgeon, despite
the patient’s earlier instructions to the contrary,
had transfused her when complications arose in
surgery. When the patient recovered competency,
she sought reversal of a judge’s order authoriz-
ing the transfusions during the time when she had
been incompetent. The Appellate Division affirmed
the order, but only on the narrow ground that the
record before the judge had left doubt as to what
the patient would have wanted under the circum-
stances. And, in very strong language, the court ev-
idenced an attitude toward the rights of Jehovah’s
39 Norwood Hospital v. Munoz, 409 Mass. 116, 4564 N.E. 2d
1017 (1991).
40 Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
41 Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 74 N.Y. 2d 607, 551 N.E. 2d 77, 84
(1990).
42 259 N.J. Super. 193, 611 A. 2d 1148 (1992).
Witnesses very different from that of Heston and
Quinlan. “[A] competent Jehovah’s Witness or per-
son holding like views,” said the court, “has every
right to refuse some or all medical treatment, even
to the point of sacrificing life. . . Should a patient de-
cide, with full knowledge of the potential situation,
to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment and the
patient communicates this decision via clear and
convincing oral directives, actions or writings, the
patient’s desires should be carried out.”43 Unlike
the opinions in Heston and Quinlan, the opinion in
Hughes is full of language sympathetic to the “ra-
tionality” of the Witnesses’ position. This is likely
to have been because of the excellent amicus brief
filed in the case by the Watchtower Bible and Tract
Society. Much of the court’s language was drawn
from material contained in that brief.
Since 1993, further progress has been made
by the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society in its
struggle with American medicine over the issue
of whether blood transfusions will be forced upon
Jehovah’s Witnesses.
In the Hughes case, the New Jersey court had ulti-
mately decided in favor of the physician-defendant
on the ground that, despite Mrs. Hughes’ signing
of the hospital’s standard written form for refusal
of blood and her oral instructions, the physician
had had a reasonable basis for doubting that Mrs.
Hughes would have continued to refuse blood if she
could have been made aware of the life-threatening
emergency that followed her surgery. In an ear-
lier case, Werth v. Taylor,44 the Court of Appeals
of Michigan had also found in favor of a physi-
cian who had been sued under the Hughes circum-
stances. In that case, the Michigan court had set
up what seemed an insurmountable legal hurdle
for unconscious Witness patients. “[I]n a situation
like the present,” the court said, “where there is an
emergency calling for an immediate decision, noth-
ing less than a fully conscious contemporaneous
decision by the patient will be sufficient to override
43 259 N.J. Super. 193, 611 A. 2d 1148 (1992) at 202–203,
611 A. 2d at 1153.
44 190 Mich. App. 141, 475 N.W.2d 426 (1991).
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evidence of medical necessity.”45 But in Hughes, the
New Jersey court had said “Should a patient de-
cide, with full knowledge of the potential situation,
to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment and the
patient communicates this decision via clear and
convincing oral directives, actions, or writings, the
patient’s desires should be carried out.”46
Counsel for the Watchtower Society responded
to the challenge of Hughes by drafting and dissemi-
nating advance-directive “writings” which attempt
to communicate in “clear and convincing” fashion a
refusal of blood transfusions “with full knowledge”
of the types of medical emergencies that might arise
in the future. Written forms, tailored to conform to
the laws of the each of the 51 American jurisdic-
tions, have been made available through the So-
ciety’s Hospital Liaison Committees in every state
and in the District of Columbia. By means of ex-
plicit language in such advance directives, the per-
son executing the document informs all health care
personnel
I am one of Jehovah’s Witnesses. On the basis of
my firmly held religious convictions, see Acts 15:28,
29, and on the basis of my desire to avoid the nu-
merous hazards and complications of blood, I ab-
solutely, unequivocally and resolutely refuse
homologous blood (another person’s blood) and
stored autologous blood (my own stored blood) un-
der any and all circumstances, no matter what my
medical condition. This means no whole blood, no
red cells, no white cells, no platelets, and no blood
plasma no matter what the consequences. Even if
health-care providers (doctors, nurses, etc.) believe
that only blood transfusion therapy will preserve my
life or health, I do not want it. Family, relatives or
friends may disagree with my religious beliefs and
with my wishes as expressed herein. However, their
disagreement is legally and ethically irrelevant be-
cause it is my subjective choice that controls. Any
such disagreement should in no way be construed
45 190 Mich. App. 141, 475 N.W.2d 426 (1991) at 147,
475 N.W.2d at 429 [emphasis in the original].
46 259 N.J. Super. 193, 202–203, 611 A.2d 1148, 1153
(1992).
as creating ambiguity or doubt about the strength or
substance of my wishes.47
The person executing this directive also informs
all health care personnel that “I accept and re-
quest alternative nonblood management to
build up or conserve my own blood, to avoid or
minimize blood loss, to replace lost circulatory vol-
ume, or to stop bleeding. For example, volume ex-
panders such as dextran, saline or Ringer’s solu-
tion, or hetastarch would be acceptable to me.”48
The person executing the form may also, (by choos-
ing among options offered on the form), make clear
to health care personnel whether or not he con-
sents to the use of products containing minor blood
fractions or non-stored autologous blood—blood
therapies upon which the Society has taken no
position and which it has designated “conscience
matters.”
A four-page document explaining the use of the
advance directive has also been prepared for distri-
bution in each jurisdiction. The informative leaflet
which accompanies the combined advance direc-
tive/health care proxy designed for use in Mas-
sachusetts (whose law authorizes the appointment
of a health-care agent or “proxy” to make health-
care decisions for an incompetent patient) urges
prospective patients to discuss the details of their
desires and their advance directives with the person
they appoint as their health care agent. It also urges
the prospective patient to “discuss with your doctor
the same information you discuss with your agent.
. . . Be sure to discuss in depth the many medical
alternatives for bloodless surgery that are available
and acceptable to you . . .. Let your doctor know
that you have thoroughly discussed these matters
with your agent. (You may even want to introduce
your agent to your doctor.) The better your doctor
understands you, the less likely it is that problems
47 “Health Care Proxy” prepared by the Watchtower Bible
and Tract Society for use in the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts (October, 1994) at p. l. The full four-page form
is attached hereto as Appendix A.
48 “Health Care Proxy” prepared by the Watchtower Bible
and Tract Society for use in the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts (October, 1994) at p. l. The full four-page form
is attached hereto as Appendix A.
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will arise.”49 To further avoid problems stemming
from misunderstanding, prospective patients are
urged to carry on their person at all times an “Ad-
vance Medical Directive/Release” card. “Thus, in
the event of an emergency in which you are un-
conscious, the Advance Medical Directive/Release
will identify you as one of Jehovah’s Witnesses,
will make known your refusal of blood, and will
identify your emergency contacts.”50 It is also sug-
gested that the emergency contacts be the same
people who have been granted health-care agency
by means of the health-care proxy.
To the extent that such documents are employed
by Jehovah’s Witness patients, one would expect
to see continuation of the existing trend toward
increasing physician compliance with refusals of
blood transfusions. Those physicians who do not
comply certainly risk running afoul of another de-
veloping trend—the increasing tendency of courts
to entertain suits for damages against physicians
who force transfusions upon unwilling patients.
For example, in the 1994 Ohio case of Perkins v.
Lavin,51 a Witness patient brought an action for
damages against her physician for having admin-
istered a blood transfusion while she was uncon-
scious. At the time that she had entered the hos-
pital for treatment of postpartum hemorrhaging,
she had given the physician oral notice that she
was not to be provided any blood or blood deriva-
tives and had signed a form stating: “I REQUEST
THAT NO BLOOD OR BLOOD DERIVATIVES BE
ADMINISTERED TO [ME] DURING THIS HOSPI-
TALIZATION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SUCH
TREATMENT MAY BE DEEMED NECESSARY IN
THE OPINION OF THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN
OR HIS ASSISTANTS TO PRESERVE LIFE OR
PROMOTE RECOVERY. I RELEASE THE ATTEND-
ING PHYSICIAN, HIS ASSISTANTS, THE HOSPI-
49 “Questions & Answers about the Health Care Proxy
(‘Combined Form’),” prepared by the Watchtower Bible
and Tract Society to accompany the health care proxy
form for Massachusetts at p. 2. The full four-page doc-
ument is attached hereto as Appendix B.
50 “Questions & Answers about the Health Care Proxy
(‘Combined Form’),” at l.
51 648 N.E.2d 839 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 1994).
TAL AND ITS PERSONNEL FROM ANY RESPON-
SIBILITY WHATEVER FOR ANY UNTOWARD RE-
SULTS DUE TO MY REFUSAL TO PERMIT THE
USE OF BLOOD OR ITS DERIVATIVES.” Nonethe-
less, the doctor had transfused her to save her life
when her blood count dropped dramatically as a
result of surgical complications. When the patient
brought suit for money damages based upon the-
ories of assault and battery and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, the physician defended
himself on the ground that he had not intended to
inflict personal injury on the plaintiff. Rather, he
claimed, he had intended merely to preserve plain-
tiff’s health and life and had, in fact, done so. The
court held for the defendant as to the claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress on the
ground that defendant’s behavior did not rise to the
level of “outrageousness” required to make out a
claim under that theory. However, as to the assault
and battery claim, the court reversed a lower court
finding for defendant, stating:
In arguing that it cannot be held liable for assault and
battery if it did not intend to “inflict personal injury,”
defendant has misapprehended the gist of the tort of
battery. Battery not only protects individuals from
harmful contact, but protects them from any offen-
sive contact.
“a harmful or offensive contact with a person result-
ing from an act intended to cause the plaintiff or a
third person to suffer such a contact, *** is a battery.”
“Battery” includes innocent intentional contact and
even intentional contact meant to assist the com-
plainant, if that contact is unauthorized ***.
52
And, in the 1994 case of Clark v. Perry,53 the
North Carolina Court of Appeals entertained a suit
for damages against a physician on grounds of mal-
practice and failure to obtain informed consent
where the allegations of plaintiff were not that
he had deliberately transfused a Witness patient
against the latter’s will, but that he had negligently
failed to discover that the patient was a Witness
52 648 N.E.2d 839 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 1994) at 841 [cita-
tions to authority omitted].
53 114 N.C. App. 297, 442 S.E.2d 57 (1994).
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who had refused all blood and blood products. The
patient’s principal physician had been made well
aware of the patient’s religious beliefs, and the pa-
tient had taken steps to make sure that his views re-
garding blood transfusions were made manifest to
hospital staff and had been entered in his hospital
record. Nonetheless, a staff specialist who claimed
to have been unaware of the patient’s religious ob-
jections ordered a blood transfusion administered
at a point when the patient was unconscious or
asleep. Ultimately, the court affirmed a dismissal
of plaintiff’s claim. But it was solely on the ground
that insufficient evidence had been introduced to
prove that the defendant had been negligent in not
knowing of the patient’s objection to blood trans-
fusions.
Perkins v. Lavin also highlights another aspect of
progress in this field since 1993. The Witness pa-
tient in that case refused a life-saving blood trans-
fusion just after having given birth to a child. The
child was clearly dependent upon the patient for
her care. Nonetheless, the court made no men-
tion of the state’s interest in preventing “abandon-
ment of minor children” in discussing whether the
plaintiff had a cause of action against her physi-
cian. Indeed, no such defense was raised by the
physician. Likewise, no mention of such a defense
was made in Werth v. Taylor, where the Witness pa-
tient had two young children at home and had just
given birth to twins. This trend against giving criti-
cal weight to such an interest of the state is perhaps
most manifest in some of the recent cases dealing
with attempts to force cesarean births upon women
who are experiencing troubled pregnancies. In the
1994 Illinois case of In Re Baby Boy Doe,54 doctors
urged a c-section or an induced birth upon a patient
on the ground that her 35-week, viable fetus would
otherwise die or be born mentally retarded. The pa-
tient refused because of her personal religious be-
liefs and chose instead to await natural childbirth.
Her physicians then applied to a court for an or-
der compelling the patient to consent to a c-section.
The court refused to grant such an order, and the
54 198 Ill. Dec. 267, 260 Ill. App.3d 392, 632 N.E.2d 326
(Ill. app., 1st Dist. 1994).
Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed. “[A] woman’s
right to refuse invasive medical treatment,” said the
court, “is not diminished during pregnancy. The
woman retains the same right to refuse invasive
treatment, even of lifesaving or other beneficial na-
ture, that she can exercise when she is not preg-
nant. The potential impact upon the fetus is not
legally relevant. . ..”55 However, whether this de-
gree of rejection of the state interest in protect-
ing innocent third parties would extend to cases
of refusal of blood was left open. In distinguish-
ing a 1964 New Jersey case56 which had held that
a transfusion could be forced upon a Witness pa-
tient so as to protect the fetus she was carrying, the
court said: “This and other similar blood transfusion
cases are inapposite, because they involve a rela-
tively non-invasive and risk-free procedure, as op-
posed to the massively invasive, risky, and painful
cesarean section. Whether such non-invasive pro-
cedures are permissible in Illinois, we leave for an-
other case.”57
In the past 5 years, the right of adult, compe-
tent Jehovah’s Witnesses to refuse blood transfu-
sions has become even more clearly established in
American law. Case law issuing from state courts
has continued the trend toward supporting pa-
tient interests in personal autonomy and religious
freedom over state interests advanced in favor of
forced transfusions. Thus, in 1997, in its opinion
in In re Fetus Brown,58 the Appellate Court of Illi-
nois moved beyond its 1994 decision in In re Baby
Boy Doe59 to hold that a blood transfusion could not
be forced upon a pregnant Witness patient in or-
der to save the life of her fetus. In doing so, the
court explicitly rejected the language in the Baby
Boy Doe opinion that had suggested that a blood
transfusion, unlike the caesarean section proposed
55 198 Ill. Dec. 267, 260 Ill. App.3d 392, 632 N.E.2d 326
(Ill. app., 1st Dist. 1994) at 273, 260 Ill. App.3d at 401,
632 N.E.2d at 332.
56 Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 42 N.J.
421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964).
57 198 Ill. Dec. at 273, 260 Ill. App.3d at 402, 632 N.E.2d
at 333.
58 294 Ill. App.3d 159, 689 N.E.2d 397 (1997).
59 260 Ill. App.3d 392, 632 N.E.2d 326 (1994).
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in Baby Boy Doe, was a “relatively noninvasive and
risk free procedure.”60 The court held in Brown that
“a blood transfusion is an invasive medical pro-
cedure that interrupts a competent adult’s bodily
integrity” and concluded that “[u]nder the law of
this State. . . we cannot impose a legal obligation
upon a pregnant woman to consent to an inva-
sive medical procedure for the benefit of her viable
fetus.”61
The right of competent Jehovah’s Witness to
refuse transfusions has become so well established
in the law that courts show increasing willingness
to entertain actions for money damages against
physicians who force transfusions upon uncon-
senting patients. Despite the difficulties such cases
present for convincing juries that substantial dam-
ages have been suffered (the physician claims that
he is being punished for having saved the life of
a patient), large money damage awards are be-
ing recovered in a significant number of cases. In
the 1994 case of Sargeant v. New York Infirmary-
Beekman Downtown Hospital,62 a New York State jury
awarded $500,000 to a Witness adult who was
transfused against his will.63 In the 1997 case of
Jones v Wrona,64 an Illinois jury awarded the plain-
tiff $150,000. Between 1991 and 1998, at least 11
similar cases were settled out-of-court for amounts
totaling in excess of $480,000.65 This trend is likely
to be helped along by the 1999 decision of the high-
est court of Massachusetts in Shine v. Vega.66 In that
case, the family of a young woman with asthma
brought an action for money damages against a
physician who claimed to have saved her life by
forcibly intubating her when she presented her-
60 260 Ill. App.3d 392, 632 N.E.2d 326 (1994) at 402, 632
N.E.2d at 333.
61 In re Fetus Brown at 171, 689 N.E.2d at 405.
62 No. 16068/91 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, July 25, 1994).
63 A new trial was ordered in this case on the ground that
the judge believed the verdict to be excessive, and it was
later settled out-of-court for $75,000.
64 No. 94 L 2935 (Cir. Ct. Will County [Ill.], November 12,
1997).
65 Letter dated August 12, 1999, from Donald T. Ridley,
Esq., Associate General, Watchtower Bible and Tract So-
ciety of Pennsylvania.
66 709 N.E.2d 58 (Ma. 1999).
self at an emergency room suffering from an acute
asthma episode. Two years after the forced intuba-
tion incident, the patient died as a result of another
acute episode because her intense fear of hospi-
tals caused by the earlier experience kept her from
again seeking emergency room assistance. The trial
court dismissed the family’s wrongful death action
on the ground that the doctor had acted properly in
light of the emergency situation. However, on ap-
peal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reversed the lower court and reinstated the damage
suit on the ground that the patient had made very
clear to the physician that she would not consent
to the intubation, even if, in the physician’s opin-
ion, refusal might lead to her death. “In the often
chaotic setting of an emergency room,” the court
observed, “physicians and medical staff frequently
must make split-second life-saving decisions. Emer-
gency medical personnel may not have the time
necessary to obtain the consent of a family mem-
ber when a patient is incapable of consenting with-
out jeopardizing the well-being of the patient. But
a competent patient’s refusal to consent to medical treat-
ment cannot be overridden whenever the patient faces a
life-threatening situation.”67
Even in cases involving minor patients, Amer-
ican courts are demonstrating increased respect
for Witnesses’ religious objections. In the United
States, the statutory age of majority at which chil-
dren are generally judged to be competent to make
decisions for themselves is 18. However, by statute
and by case law, children below the age of ma-
jority are under certain circumstances considered
to be “mature minors” and empowered to make
some medical decisions for themselves. The “ma-
ture minor” doctrine has begun to be extended by
court decision to situations where minor Witness
patients refuse blood transfusions for themselves.
Thus, in the 1999 case of In re Rena,68 the Appeals
Court of Massachusetts reversed a lower court de-
cision ordering the administration of a blood trans-
fusion upon a 17-year-old Witness patient because
the lower court had failed to consider the level of
67 709 N.E.2d 58 (Ma. 1999) at 65 [emphasis supplied].
68 46 Mass. App. Ct. 335, 705 N.E.2d 1155 (1999).
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maturity of the patient in issuing its order. The
patient’s level of maturity was relevant for deter-
mining whether or not she was competent to make
the decision for herself. It was also relevant for de-
ciding what was truly in her “best interest” even if
she was not yet fully competent to make the deci-
sion for herself. “Although the judge did consider
Rena’s wishes and her religious convictions in this
matter, he made no determination as to her matu-
rity to make an informed choice,” the court said.
Pointing to earlier decisions of the Illinois Supreme
Court69 and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court70 in
which the rights of mature minors had been pro-
tected under similar circumstances, the court con-
cluded “we think [the trial judge’s action] was er-
ror particularly in the circumstances of this case
where Rena will soon attain the age of 18. In addi-
tion, in assessing Rena’s preferences and religious
convictions, he should not have relied solely on
the representations made by her attorney and her
parents but should have heard Rena’s own testi-
mony on these issues where she apparently had
the testimonial capacity to answer questions. Only
after evaluating this evidence in light of her ma-
turity could the judge properly determine her best
interests.”71
Where Witness parents wish to refuse blood
transfusions for their minor children, American law
generally does not permit them to do so if there is
no alternative course of acceptable medical treat-
ment. As the US Supreme Court observed in the
1944 case of Prince v. Massachusetts,72 “Parents may
be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does
not follow that they are free, in identical circum-
stances, to make martyrs of their children before
they have reached the age of full and legal discre-
tion when they can make that choice for them-
selves.” In 1968, the US Supreme Court affirmed,
on the authority of Prince, a lower court decision
that a minor could be transfused over the protest
69 In re E.G., 133 Ill.2d 98, 549 N.E.2d 322 (1989).
70 In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990).
71 In re Rena, 46 Mass. App. Ct. at 337–38, 705 N.E.2d
at 1157. For a similar holding, see also, In re W.M., 823
S.W.2d 128 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
72 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
of his Witness parents.73 However, where alterna-
tive acceptable courses of medical treatment are
available, cases have recognized the right of parents
to make reasonable medical choices for their chil-
dren different from those which attending physi-
cians believe to be best.74 In a recent South Car-
olina decision, Banks v. Medical University of South
Carolina,75 that right was explicitly held to apply
to situations where Witness parents refuse blood
transfusions for their children. In that case, the
child died while being provided emergency treat-
ment that included an unconsented-to blood trans-
fusion. The parents sued the hospital and physi-
cians involved for wrongful death and battery and
introduced expert evidence that there had been no
emergency requiring transfusion of blood plasma.
The lower court found for the hospital, but the
Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed on ap-
peal. “Banks concedes that she had no author-
ity to withhold necessary medical treatment from
her child even if such treatment was contrary to
her religious views,” the court said. “However, she
contends that the transfusions were not necessary
and, therefore, her consent was required. She pre-
sented testimony of an expert witness. . . to estab-
lish that there was no emergency justifying the
transfusion of blood to Phaedra. . .. We find that
Banks has presented an issue of material fact as
to whether Phaedra was in a life threatening sit-
uation which would have justified the administra-
tion of the transfusions without parental consent.
Therefore, summary judgment was improperly
granted.”76
The willingness of the Banks court to consider
the question of the reasonableness of a physi-
cian’s decision to transfuse in an emergency sit-
uation evidences another aspect of the progress
being made in the United States by The Watch-
tower Society. As a result of the extraordinary
73 Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 278 F. Supp.
488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff’d. per curiam, 390 U.S. 598
(1968).
74 See, for example, In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393
N.E.2d 1009 (1979).
75 444 S.E.2d 519 (S.C. 1994).
76 444 S.E.2d 519 (S.C. 1994) at 521–22.
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work of the Society’s Hospital Liaison Committees,
bloodless medical treatment (including bloodless
surgery) is gradually becoming the “gold stan-
dard” of practice among top physicians and sur-
geons in the United States. Whereas, 5 years ago,
bloodless medicine and surgery programs were es-
tablished at only about 14 centers in the United
States, there are about 100 such centers in the
United States today.77 These centers are liber-
ally distributed across the country. Sites include
some of the most prestigious medical institutions in
America, such as Ohio’s Cleveland Clinic, which
has been rated as the top center in the United
States for heart surgery. With help from the Hos-
pital Liaison Committees, the American medical
community is learning that bloodless medicine and
surgery tend to produce better results for patients
and significantly reduce medical costs as well. Pa-
tients who are treated without transfusions not
only avoid the risk of contracting blood-borne dis-
eases such as AIDS and hepatitis, they also recover
more quickly from surgical procedures (transfu-
sions tend to depress the body’s natural immune
system) and spend fewer days in the hospital.78
A study recently conducted by members of the
Cleveland Clinic’s anesthesiology department con-
cluded that using a bloodless surgery protocol 50%
of the time “could save the healthcare industry up
to $3.7 billion dollars a year. That includes sav-
ings of about $400 to $1400 for every unit of
transfused blood from outside donors, factoring in











Clearly, it is not only Witness patients who ben-
efit from the work of the Hospital Liaison Commit-
tees. “No one wants to get blood,” one heart sur-
geon was recently quoted as saying. “As patients
77 Mary McGrath. Bloodless surgery answer to some pa-
tients’ prayers, Omaha World-Herald, August 10, 1999, at
pp.. 1, 8.
78 Article in February 1998 issue of Archives of Patholog-
ical Laboratory Medicine and article in February 11, 1999
issue of the New England Journal of Medicine.
79 Ron Shinkman. More going bloodless, Modern Health-
care, November 9, 1998, at p. 57.
become more informed, they’re going to specify
they don’t want blood products. Maybe not to the
extent of dying for it (as do Witnesses), but to re-
duce risks.”80 One California bloodless surgery cen-
ter reported this year that “one fifth of the patients
requesting bloodless surgery are non-Witnesses.”81
Another California center, Alvarado Hospital, re-
ported that only 35% of its patients in 1998 (com-
pared to 97% in 1997) received blood or other
blood products such as plasma. “[T]he heart-lung
surgery department at [Alvarado] has cut expenses
by 40 percent by reducing transfusions, which cost
up to $300 per unit for the blood and its stor-
age and shortening hospital stays for patients,” a
nurse-specialist stated.82 Widespread use of blood-
less medicine and surgery has been helped along by
the development of new procedures for recycling
the patient’s own blood, for increasing the oxygen-
carrying capacity of red blood cells, and for stim-
ulating the body to produce additional red blood
cells. “But the most important technique,” say prac-
titioners, “is simply good housekeeping—cutting
cleanly and stopping the bleeding as it occurs.”83
For this purpose, surgeons will frequently use elec-
tro cautery to stop bleeding as they cut or em-
ploy new harmonic scalpels, which use ultrasonic
vibrations to cut and seal the wound at the same
time.
Ironically, through their success in improving
surgical and medical techniques for all patients,
Witness patients seem to have caused a slight medi-
cal backlash against themselves. Now that the med-
ical reasons for refusing blood transfusions have be-
come so well known, attention has been distracted
somewhat from the Witnesses’ religious objections.
Even the Witnesses’ “blood refusal card” (carried by
members to prevent blood from being administered
80 Eric Niiler, Bloodless surgery, San Diego Union-
Tribune, February 18, 1999, at pp. E-1 and E-7.
81 Eric Niiler, Bloodless surgery, San Diego Union-
Tribune, February 18, 1999, at p. E-7.
82 Eric Niiler, Bloodless surgery, San Diego Union-
Tribune, February 18, 1999.
83 Andrew Pollack, “Bloodless” surgery gains new accep-
tance, The New York Times, April 21, 1998, at p. F8-F9.
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to them while unconscious during an emergency)
gives among the reasons for refusal “the numer-
ous risks and complications resulting from the use
of blood.” For this reason, some doctors have sug-
gested that they will not honor the blood refusal
card in cases where they believe that the medical
benefits of a blood transfusion outweigh its med-
ical “risks and complications.” In an article pub-
lished in 1998,84 two American physicians alleged
that Witness patients who execute the cards do
so after having heard only The Watchtower Soci-
ety’s one-sided views of the medical risks of blood
transfusions. They urge emergency physicians, as
a result, not to comply with wishes expressed in
a blood refusal card unless a Witness patient reaf-
firms them after having had medical choices fully
explained to him or her at the time of the emer-
gency. As Donald Ridley, Associate General Coun-
sel for The Watchtower Society points out in an
answering article,85 this line of reasoning, were it
to be taken seriously, would put in jeopardy all of
the progress in patients’ rights made in the United
States in the last 25 years. Doctors in the United
States do not have legal power to require patients
to prove that a decision to refuse treatment is “med-
ically rational” in order to have the refusal re-
spected. And, ultimately, the Witness blood refusal
card does not justify refusal on grounds of medi-
cal rationality. It relies upon the Witnesses’ reading
of the Bible’s proscription against eating blood and
states that the patient is willing to accept death over
violation of that proscription.
In the end, assiduous protection of the rights of
Witness patients depends at least as much upon the
work of lawyers as it does upon the work of doc-
tors. In this respect, The Watchtower Society has
come a long way since 1964 when, in the George-
town Hospital Case, Mr. Jones, who had been advised
by Judge Wright that he should obtain a lawyer,
84 Migden DR, Braen GR, The Jehovah’s Witness blood
refusal card: ethical and medicolegal considerations for
emergency physicians. Acad Emerg Med 1998;5:815.
85 Donald Ridley. Honoring Jehovah’s Witnesses’ advance
directives in emergencies: a response to Drs. Migden and
Braen. Acad Emerg Med 1998;5:824.
“went to the telephone and returned in 10 or 15
minutes to advise that he had taken the matter
up with his church and that he had decided that
he did not want counsel.”86 A growing number of
attorneys in the United States now represent Wit-
ness patients in blood refusal cases with assistance
from the Society. Associate General Counsel Ri-
dley has recently published a very helpful hand-
book for “Legally Defending Jehovah’s Witnesses’
Choice of Alternative Nonblood Management” that
is made available to such attorneys. Ridley also
has appeared as counsel for either Witness patients
or The Watchtower Society as amicus curiae in the
most significant refusal cases heard in the American
courts in the last 10 years. And he contributes to
journals of law,87 medicine,88 and hospital admin-
istration89 scholarly articles that effectively make
the case for respecting refusal of blood transfu-
sions on grounds of religious freedom and patient
autonomy.
For the moment at least, the efforts of support-
ive medical and legal personnel have combined
to produce a situation in the United States where
nonconsensual transfusion of adult Witness pa-
tients has become extremely rare. “This is a dra-
matic change from just five or ten years ago,” Ri-
dley reports, “when there was still a great deal of
86 Application of the President and Directors of George-
town College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
87 See, for example, Donald Ridley. In practice: health
care law: whose life is it anyway? NJ Law J 1999;156:121,
and Donald Ridley. Health care decision making in the
family. Family Law Update1997, 237.
88 See, for example, Donald Ridley. Guest Editorial: Re-
specting pregnant women’s treatment choices, Obstet Gy-
necol Surv 1999;54:215 and Donald Ridley. Judicial di-
agnosis: treating children of Jehovah’s Witnessses. Med
Health RI 1998;81:418.
89 See, for example, Donald Ridley. Treatment refusals
by pregnant women, 15 Hosp. Law Newsletter # 9 (July
1998); Donald Ridley. Accepting patients’ refusals of
treatment, 13 Hosp. Law Newsletter # 12 (October 1996);
Donald Ridley. Working with Jehovah’s Witnesses on
treatment issues, 12 Hosp. Law Newsletter # 4 (Febru-
ary 1995); and Donald Ridley. Accommodating Jehovah’s
Witnesses’ choice of nonblood management. J Healthc
Risk Manag 1990;Winter:17.
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uncertainty about the law. Since then, as a result of
the law’s repeated defense and protection of patient
choice, I can only conclude that providers either are
rarely going to court to obtain such orders or that
courts, when so importuned, are not granting such
orders.”90 However, it would be mistaken to con-
clude that the need for vigilance has ended. Among
other things, recent court decisions seem to open
the door to greater participation by legislatures and
executive agencies in defining rights in this area.
Judges have lately shown a preference for avoiding
constitutional questions, if possible, by protecting
the right to refuse treatment under the common
law of informed consent rather than by means of
constitutional law.91 And they have shown as well
a propensity to avoid weighing state interests fa-
voring treatment against a patient’s right to refuse
treatment where the state itself has not entered
the case to press such interests.92 Thus these recent
cases leave open the possibility that courts could
rule differently if legislation were passed remov-
ing some of the protection provided by the com-
mon law or if the executive branch were to inter-
vene in a case to press the importance of coun-
tervailing state interests. Were legislatures or ex-
ecutive agencies to consider taking such steps, ef-
forts would have to be mounted to oppose them
politically and legally. Happily, executive agencies
have thus far shown no interest in intervening in
such cases. And, to the extent that state legislatures
have shown interest in passing legislation in this
field, it has been more to add protections to the
90 Letter dated August 12, 1999, from Donald T. Ridley,
Esq., Associate General, Watchtower Bible and Tract So-
ciety of Pennsylvania.
91 See, for example, Stamford Hospital v. Vega, 236 Conn.
646, 674 A.2d 821 (1996) and see generally James Hank-
ins, The Common Law Right of bodily self-determination
in Connecticut: life and death after Stamford Hospital v.
Vega. Conn L Rev 1997;29:945.
92 Stamford Hospital v. Vega, 236 Conn. 646, 674 A.2d 821
(1996) and Harrell v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 678 So.2d 455 (D.
Ct. App. FL 1996).
right to refuse blood transfusions than to take them
away.93
The Witnesses seem to be successfully recover-
ing from the blow dealt them in Georgetown. The
days when blood transfusions could be forced upon
Witness patients on the ground that refusal was
“medically irrational” are, hopefully, over. By dint
of cases like Georgetown, the American medical pro-
fession had achieved something of the status of
an established state church. Its dogma regarding
the low risk and high benefits of blood transfu-
sions had been forced upon unbelievers by the
state. Through education and advocacy, the Wit-
nesses have convinced the state to reconsider its
position and to take a more neutral stance between
the beliefs of their religion and those of American
medicine. They have even managed to get Amer-
ican medicine to reconsider some of its beliefs in
the light of further evidence. In the process, all of
American society has benefited. Not only Jehovah’s
Witnesses, but patients in general, are today less
likely to be given unnecessary blood transfusions
because of the work of the Witnesses’ Hospital Li-
aison Committees. Patients in general enjoy greater
autonomy over a whole range of health care deci-
sions because of the work done by the Witnesses
as part of an overall patients’ rights movement.
And the causes of freedom in general and religious
freedom in particular have been advanced by the
Witnesses’ dedicated resistance to efforts to force
them to take action inconsistent with their religious
beliefs.
93 See, for example, New York Public Health Law, sec.
2803-c (a): “Every patient’s civil and religious liberties,
including the right to independent personal decisions and
knowledge of available choices, shall not be infringed and
the facility shall encourage and assist in the fullest possi-
ble exercise of these rights.” and (c) “Every patient shall
have the right to receive adequate and appropriate medi-
cal care, to be fully informed of his or her medical condi-
tion and proposed treatment unless medically contraindi-
cated, and to refuse medication and treatment after being
fully informed of and understanding the consequences.”

































Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care
(Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated title 20, §§5601 to 5607)
(1) I, ,
Print your full name
am of sound mind and I voluntarily make this Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care. There are two
parts to this document: Part 1 sets forth my health-care instructions; Part 2 appoints a person to make
health-care decisions for me on matters not covered in my instructions. This document shall take effect
upon my incapacity.
PART 1–Health-Care Instructions
(2) I am one of Jehovah’s Witnesses. On the basis of my firmly held religious convictions, see Acts 15:28,
29, and on the basis of my desire to avoid the numerous hazards and complications of blood, I absolutely,
unequivocally and resolutely refuse homologous blood (another person’s blood) and stored autolo-
gous blood (my own stored blood) under any and all circumstances, no matter what my medical condition.
This means no whole blood, no red cells, no white cells, no platelets, and no blood plasma no matter what
the consequences. Even if health-care providers (doctors, nurses etc.) believe that only blood transfusion
therapy will preserve my life or health, I do not want it. Family, relatives or friends may disagree with my
religious beliefs and with my wishes expressed herein. However, their disagreement is legally and ethically
irrelevant because it is my subjective choice that controls. Any such disagreement should in no way be
construed as creating ambiguity or doubt about the strength or substance of my wishes.
Also, because many health-care providers view Jehovah’s Witnesses refusal of blood with disapproval
and even hostility, I am concerned that someone may claim that I orally consented to a blood transfusion.
Thus, I hereby state that it is my conscious decision that my absolute refusal of blood transfusion shall
not be revocable by me orally. If anyone claims that I have orally consented to a blood transfusion, I
demand that such claim be ignored unless confirmed in writing signed by me and subscribed by at least two
disinterested witnesses.
(3) With respect to minor blood fractions* or products containing minor blood fractions, according to
my conscience I ACCEPT: [initial one of the three choices below]
(a) NONE.
(b) ALL.
(c) SOME. That is, I ACCEPT: [initial choice(s) below]
Products that may have been processed with or contain small amounts of albumin (e.g., streptoki-
nase, and some recombinant products [such as erythropoietin (EPO) and synthesised clotting factors], and
some radionuclide scan preparations may contain albumin).
Immunoglobulins (e.g., Rh immune globulin, gammaglobulin, horse serum, snake bite antivenins).
Clotting factors (e.g., fibrinogen, Factors VII, VIII, IX, XII).
Other:
(4) I accept and request alternative nonblood medical management to build up or conserve my
own blood, to avoid or minimize blood loss, to replace lost circulatory volume, or to stop bleeding. For
example, volume expanders such as dextran, saline or Ringer’s solution, or hetastarch would be acceptable
to me.
(5) With respect to non-stored autologous blood* (my own non-stored blood), according to my con-
science I ACCEPT: [initial choice(s) below]
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(a) DIALYSIS OR HEART-LUNG EQUIPMENT (diversion of my blood within an extracorporeal circuit
that does not involve storage or more than brief interruption of blood flow and that is constantly linked to my
circulatory system, provided any equipment used is not primed with stored blood).
(b) HEMODILUTION (dilution of my blood within an extracorporeal circuit that does not involve storage or
more than brief interruption of blood flow and that is constantly linked to my circulatory system, provided
any equipment used is not primed with stored blood).
(c) INTRAOPERATIVE OR POSTOPERATIVE BLOOD SALVAGE (contemporaneous recovery and rein-
fusion of blood lost during or after surgery that does not involve storage or more than brief interruption of
blood flow, provided any equipment used is not primed with stored blood).
(d) NONE.
* Warning: Consult your doctor regarding potential health risks.
(6) With respect to providing, withholding, or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment at the end of life,
and consistent with Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated title 20, § 5404, my declaration, which in no way
alters my absolute refusal of blood as directed above, is: [initial one of three choices below]
(a) NOT TO PROLONG LIFE*. That is, if to a reasonable degree of medical certainty my condition is hopeless
(for example, if to a reasonable degree of medical certainty I have an incurable and irreversible condition
that will result in my death within a relatively short time, or if am unconscious and to a reasonable de-
gree of medical certainty will not regain consciousness, or if I have brain damage or a brain disease that
makes me unable to recognize people or communicate and to a reasonable degree of medical certainty my
condition will not improve), I do not want my life to be prolonged. Thus in such situations, I do not want
mechanical respiration (ventilation), cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), tube feeding (artificial nutrition
or hydration), etc. However, I do want palliative care – treatment for comfort.
(b) TO PROLONG LIFE. That is, I want my life to be prolonged as long as possible within the limits
of generally accepted health-care standards, although I realize this means that I might be kept alive on
machines for years in a hopeless condition.
(c) OTHER. [If you do not completely agree with either (a) or (b) above, you can initial here and
write your own end-of-life instructions in the space provided. NOTE: Unless your agent knows your wishes
about artificial nutrition and hydration, your agent may not be able to make decisions about these matters.]
(7) Other health-care instructions (e.g., your wishes regarding organ donation, current medication, aller-
gies, other medical problems, etc.):
(8) I am primarily concerned that my refusal of blood and choice of alternative nonblood management be
respected regardless of my medical condition. My rights under the federal and state constitutions and state
common law require health-care providers to respect and comply with my treatment decisions. My rights
are not dependant on, and do not vary with, my medical condition. Thus my decision to refuse blood and
choose nonblood management must be respected even if my life or health is deemed to be threatened by
my refusal. Stamford Hosp. v. Vega, 674 A.2d 821 (Conn. 1996) (Witness patient’s refusal of blood protected
by state common law right of bodily self-determination); In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. (1993) (Witness
patient’s refusal of blood protected by state constitutional rights of personal privacy and religious freedom);
Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass. 1991) (Witness patient’s refusal of blood protected by state


















common law right of bodily self-determination and federal constitutional right of personal privacy); Fosmire
v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990) (Witness patient’s refusal of blood protected by state common law
right of bodily self-determination); In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989) (Witness patient’s refusal of blood
protected by state common law right of bodily self-determination); Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d
96 (Fla. 1989) (Witness patient’s refusal of blood protected by state constitutional rights of personal privacy
and religious freedom); In re Milton, 505 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio 1987) (non-Witness patient’s religion-based
refusal of treatment protected by 1st Amendment guarantee of free exercise of religion; In re Brown, 478 So.
2d 1033 (Miss. 1985) (Witness patient’s refusal of blood protected by state constitutional rights of personal
privacy and religious freedom; In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972) (Witness patient’s refusal of blood
protected by 1st Amendment guarantee of free exercise of religion); In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435
(Ill. 1965) (Witness patient’s refusal of blood protected by 1st Amendment guarantee of free exercise of
religion).
* [This footnote applies only to pregnant women.] If I am pregnant and there is a reasonable chance my
fetus could survice, I want my life to be prolonged for the sake of my fetus, notwithstanding my instructions
in Paragraph (6)(a). However, in no way does this change my wishes about nonblood treatment for both
myself and my fetus. After any efforts to save my fetus, my instructions in Paragraph (6)(a) shall again
control.
The United States Supreme Court has said that “[i]t is settled now . . . that the Constitution places limits
on a State’s right to interfere with a person’s most basic decisions about . . . bodily integrity.” Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992). In Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), the
Supreme Court stated: “It cannot be disputed that the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution] protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining
medical treatment.” Id. at 281. The Court also said: “The principle that a competent person has a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior
decisions.” Id. at 278. In addition, in Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), the Supreme Court said
that prison inmates suffering from mental disorders possess “a significant liberty interest in avoiding the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.” Id. at 221-22. The Court also observed that “[t]he forcible injection of medical into a nonconsenting
person’s body represents a substantial interference with that person’s liberty.” Id. at 229.
There is no indication in these Supreme Court cases that a person must be in a terminal, irreversible,
incurable or untreatable condition, or in a permanently unconscious or vegetative state in order to exer-
cise his fundamental Fourth Amendment right to refuse treatment or otherwise control what is done to
his body. Indeed, Nancy Cruzan herself was not terminally ill. See 497 U.S. at 266, n.1. Moreover, implicit
throughout the majority opinion in Cruzan and expressly stated in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence and all
the dissents (except Justice Scalia’s) is the acceptance of advance written directives as clear and convincing
evidence of a formerly competent person’s wishes. Therefore, because I have prepared this advance direc-
tive while competent, if I become incompetent, my wishes as expressed herein must be respected as if I
were competent.
(9) [This paragraph applies only to pregnant women.] In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860
(1992), the Supreme Court confirmed that “viability marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest
in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on therapeutic abortions.” Thus, since
I have the right to abort my pregnancy before viability I necessarily have the lesser right to refuse blood
transfusions before viability. In addition, even if my fetus is viable, the Supreme Court has said that mothers
cannot be exposed to increased medical risks for the sake of their fetuses and that the state’s interest in the
potential life of the fetus is insufficient to override the mother’s interest in preserving her own health.
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Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768 –71 (1986); see Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). Also, in the cases of In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990),
and In re Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1198 (1994), refusals of treatment by
women with viable fetuses were upheld. Although both of these cases involved Caesarean sections, as a
matter of principle and logic they show that it is the pregnant woman who should decide what is to be done
to herself and her fetus. Therefore, I demand that my refusal of blood and choice of alternative nonblood
management be followed and that my doctors manage my care and the care of my fetus without transfused
blood.
(10) In sum, based on federal and state constitutional law and state common law, I demand that the
instructions set forth in this document be followed regardless of my medical condition. Any attempt to
administer blood to me contrary to my instructions will be a violation of my Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest in bodily self-determination, my First Amendment right of religious free exercise, my state
constitutional rights of personal liberty or privacy and religious freedom, and my state common law rights
of bodily self-determination and personal autonomy.
PART 2–Appointment of Health-Care Agent
(11) I hereby appoint the following person as my health-care agent: [Notice: You may choose any adult to
be your agent, but it is recommended that you not choose your doctor, any of your doctor’s employees, or
any employee of a hospital or nursing home where you might be a patient, unless the individual is related
to you by blood, marriage, or adoption.]
Agent’s full name:
Agent’s address:
Work Telephone: ( ) Home Telephone: ( ) Other: ( )
(12) If the agent appointed above is unavailable, unable, or unwilling to serve or continue to serve, then
I appoint the following alternative agent to serve with the same powers: [See “Notice” in Paragraph 11
above.]
Alternate agent’s full name:
Alternate agent’s address:
Work Telephone: ( ) Home Telephone: ( ) Other: ( )
(13) To the extent this document sets forth my health-care instructions, there is no need or reason to look
to my agent for a decision. However, I grant my agent full power and authority to ensure that the wishes
expressed in this document are followed by health-care providers. Further, I grant my agent full power
and authority to make health-care decisions for me on matters not covered by this document. My agent’s
authority is effective as long as I am incapable of make my own health-care decisions.
(14) In harmony with the limitations in the preceding paragraph, my agent’s authority shall include but
not be limited to the following:
(a) To consent to, refuse, or withdraw consent to any or all types of medical care treatment, surgical
procedures, diagnostic procedures, medication, and the use of other mechanical or other procedures
related to health care. This authorization includes the power to consent to pain-relieving medication for
relief of severe and intractable pain.
(b) To request, review, and received any information, oral or written, regarding my physical or mental
health, including, but not limited to, medical and hospital records, and to consent to the disclosure of
this information.
(c) To employ or discharge my health-care providers; to authorize my admission or discharge from any
hospital, nursing home, mental health or other medical care facility; and the take any lawful actions that
may be necessary to carry out my wishes, including the granting of releases from liability to health-care
providers.


















(15) A copy of this document shall be as valid as the original. I ask that a copy of this document be made
part of my permanent medical record. I have provided copies of this document to my health-care agent and
alternate agent. It is my intention that this document be honored in any jurisdiction in which it is presented
and that it be construed liberally to give my agent the fullest discretion in making health-care decisions in
my behalf consistent with my instructions.
(16) If my health-care providers cannot respect my wishes as expressed in this document or as otherwise
known to my agent and a transfer of care is necessary to effectuate my wishes, I direct my health-care
providers to cooperate with and assist my agent in promptly transferring me to another health-care provider
that will respect my wishes. In such circumstances, I direct my health-care providers to transfer promptly
all my medical records, including a copy of this document, to the other health-care provider.
(17) This document revokes any prior health-care power of attorney or health-care proxy executed by me.
(18) The provisions of this entire document are separable, so that the invalidity of one or more provisions
shall not affect any others.





(21) STATEMENT BY WITNESSES
I declare that the person who signed this document (the principal) or the person who signed on behalf
and at the direction of the principal knowingly and voluntarily signed this writing by signature or mark in
my presence. Also, I am not the person appointed as agent or alternate agent by this document.
Signature of witness 1 Signature of witness 2
Print name Print name
Address Address
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Checklist for Filling out Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care 
(check off each box below as section is completed) 
What To Do )s(ecnerefeR 
 Paragraph (1) •Print your full name……………………………………………………………. self-explanatory 
  snoitcurtsnI eraC-htlaeH–1 TRAP 
 Paragraph (3) •Initial one of the three choices regarding minor blood fractions.*………….... w94 10/1 p.31, 
w90 6/1 pp. 30-
1
 Paragraph (5) •Initial choices(s) regard autologous blood.*…………………………………… w89 3/1 pp. 30-1 
 Paragraph (6) •Initial one of the three choices regarding end-of-life decisions……………….. q&a #18-20, 
g91 10/22 pp. 
3-9, g86 9/8 pp. 
20-1
PART 2–Appointment of Health-Care Agent 
 Paragraph (11) •Name a health-care agent, list address, and telephone numbers……………… q&a #3, 21-26 
 Paragraph (12) •Name an alternate health-care agent, etc. …………………………………….. self-explanatory
 Paragraph (20) •Sign your name in the presence of two witnesses, etc. ………………………. self-explanatory
 Paragraph (21) •Your two witnesses sign, etc. ………………………………………………….. self-explanatory
___________________
Abbreviations: w = The Watchtower; g = Awake!; q&a = Refers to this 4-page guide with its questions and answers. 
*This is a conscience matter and may not be acceptable to some of Jehovah’s Witnesses.   PA 1/97 
 (You may wish to type or write in the language indicated below on your Advance Medical Directive/Release to 






– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 
MEDICAL DIRECTIVE 
(Signed document inside) 
I have also executed a 
health-care power of 
attorney (or proxy). 
NO BLOOD 
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